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THE "HOMICIDE SCENE" EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WARRANT REQUIREMENT: A DEAD ISSUE?
The Supreme Court traditionally has used very
narrow language in cases involving warrantless
searches. The Court has stated that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are unreasonable
per se under the fourth amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."' Notwithstanding this precise language, the exceptions recognized by the Court have
been neither "few" nor "well-delineated." Rather
than adopt a narrow construction of the fourth
amendment, the Court has liberally interpreted
the amendment and expanded its exceptions in
order to avoid inequitable results. 2 During the past
ten years some lower federal and state courts, responding more to the practical results of Supreme
Court warrantless search cases than to the Court's
rhetoric, have recognized a significant new excep3
tion to the fourth amendmentYs
warrant requirement: the "homicide scene" exception.4 This excep1Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
2See Haddad, Well-DelineatedExceptions, Claimsof Sham,
and FourfoldProbable Cause, 68J. CRM. L. & C. 198 (1977).
'The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
'See United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1972); Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Tex.
1974), rev'don other grounds, 489 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1974);
Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1039 (1969); State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566
P.2d 273 (1977) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); State v. Duke, 110 Ariz.
320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974) (en banc); People v. Superior
Court, 41 Cat. App. 3d 636, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1974);
People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr.
659 (1973); People v. King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 296 N.E.2d
731 (1973); State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969);
Davis v. State, 236 Md. "389, 204 A.2d (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 966 (1964); State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481
(Mo. 1970) (en banc); Geary v. State, 91 Nev. 784, 544
P.2d 417 (1975); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387,
271 S.W.2d 643 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954);
State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 276 A.2d 18 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971); Longuest v. State, 495 P.2d
575 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).

tion5 allows police officers, who make a legitimate
warrantless entty into a dwelling in response to
reports of a death or great bodily injury, to conduct
a warrantless search of the dwelling for suspects,
victims, and evidence related to the crime.6 The
homicide scene exception has not received unanimous recognition by the lower courts,7 and the
Supreme Court in its first consideration of the
exception in Mincey v. Arizona s appeared to decide
against its recognition. Upon closer examination,
however, it appears that the homicide scene exception has actually survived Mincey under the protection of other warrant exceptions and deserves recognition in its own right in certain cases. This
comment will explore the emergence of the homicide scene exception, the effect of the Mincey decision upon the exception, its relationship to other
exceptions, and the acceptable scope of a warrantless homicide scene search under present law.
I. THE

ARGUMENT FOR THE HOMICIDE SCENE

EXCEPTION

Before looking at the arguments for and against
the homicide scene exception, it is necessary to
examine the Supreme Court's test for establishing
new warrant exceptions as expressed in dictum in
5The controversy between the homicide scene exception and the warrant requirement only comes into play
in areas where someone, usually a defendant, has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978). No such expectation of privacy
exists when a body is found in a public place, and no
question as to the right of the police to conduct a warrantless search of the public place arises. No cases have
been found where the homicide scene exception arose
other than in situations involving private dwellings or
hotel rooms.
6The notion that a warrantless entry is justified in a
life-threatening, emergency situation has become an accepted part of the fourth amendment doctrine. See, e.g.,
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); United States v.
Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 377 U.S.
1004 (1964); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486 (Del. 1967).
Consequently, this comment is limited to the permissible
scope of searches that occur after a justified warrantless
entry.
7
See, e.g., Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir.
1972); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971);
People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 557 P.2d 399 (1976)
(en bane); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 201 N.W.2d
153 (1972).
8 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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Camara v. Municipal Court. Although Camara involved an administrative
search, the test has gen0
eral application:'
In assessing whether the public interest demands
creation of a general exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is
not whether the public interest justifies the type of
search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in
turn depends in part upon whether the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.... Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails. 1
The key to the Camara test is the Court's concern
with the "frustration of governmental purpose."
The Camara test strikes a balance between the need
to search and the invasion which results from the
search. The length of time required to obtain a
warrant is an important factor in determining
whether the governmental purpose is likely to be
frustrated,1 2 but it is not the only factor courts
public polmust consider. Courts also must weigh
3
icy considerations in the balance.'
One element of public policy is the gravity of
the offense. The Justices have discussed both sides
of this issue. In his dissent in Brinegar v. United
States,14 Justice Jackson stated the argument for
considering the gravity of the offense when creating
exceptions to the warrant requirement:
[1f we are to makejudicial exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me they
should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the
offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is
kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock about
the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the
search. The officers might be unable to show prob9 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
' Administrative searches differ from searches for evidence in criminal cases only in the amount of probable
cause required to be shown. See note 93 infra and accompanying text. This difference does not destroy the applicability of the Camaratest for the creation of new warrant
exceptions because "searches for administrative purposes,
like searches for evidence of crime, are encompassed by
the Fourth Amendment." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 506 (1978).
" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 533-37.
2 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71
(1966) (alcoholic content of blood would diminish if time
were taken to secure a warrant).
'3 Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537.
14338 U.S. 160 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[Vol. 71

able cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such
an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because
it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that
indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened
life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch
a bootlegger. 15
Thus, in a murder scene situation, the discovery of
the body may "heighten" the exigent quality 6 and
justify a broader search than would be permissible
if the victim merely were slightly wounded.
In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has
refused to adopt the Brinegar dissent and consider7
the gravity of the offense. In Katz v. United States1
the Court refused to exempt the surveillance of a
telephone booth from the usual warrant requirements. The majority opinion sidestepped the issue
of national security and gravity of the offense,
relegating the subject to a footnote.' 8 However,
Justices Douglas and Brennan addressed the issue
in a separate concurring opinion. The two Justices
would require a warrant even where the crime
involved was treason, the worst crime of all.' 9 They
intended to "respect the present lines of distinction
and not improvise because a particular crime seems
particularly heinous." 20 In Mincey v. Arizona, the
Court again declined to hold that the seriousness
of the offense under investigation itself creates
exigent circumstances of the kind that under the
fourth amendment justify a warrantless search. 2'
Thus, at present, the gravity of the offense alone
will not justify creating an exception to the warrant
requirement. However, the gravity of the offense
can be considered as a factor within the Camara
balancing test for the creation of new exceptions.
When the offense is grave and the situation necessitates a quick police response, the argument for an
exception to the warrant requirement is compelling. For example, where the police find a murdered body and have no immediate suspect, the
fleeing felon gains valuable time while the police
are in the process of obtaining a warrant. The
"sId. at 183.
16State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 268 (Mo. 1978)
(en bane). See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
17389 U.S. 347.
is 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 ("Whether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
the fourth amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.").
'0 Id.at 360 (Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
' ld.
2'437 U.S. at 394.
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public interest in apprehending a murderer may
tip the balance in favor of an immediate warrantless search of the premises to determine the identity
of the suspect.22
The societal interest in allowing police to make
a warrantless search in order to capture a murderer
is necessarily premised on the belief that immediate
police investigations are more likely to result in
apprehension of the murderer than are later investigations. However, the modern Supreme Court
does not attach substantial weight to the interest
in police efficiency.23 Police effectiveness is not the
only policy consideration supporting an exception
for homicide scene searches. There is also the longrun benefit of public confidence in the criminal
justice system that inures when swift punishment
is brought to bear on the perpetrators of a most
serious crime-murder. The public needs to know
that the system will work, and work swiftly and
surely in such a case.
Furthermore, in certain instances requiring the
police to obtain a warrant is impractical and counterproductive. A homicide scene exception is appropriate in such circumstances. Frequently, the
police investigating an apparent homicide will not
know how or why it was done, nor who did it.
Consequently, the police will be unable to specify
exactly what they want to seize or where they want
to search with sufficient particularity to support
the issuance of a warrant.Y A federal district court
was confronted with this problem,s2 and handled
it succinctly:
The pointlessness of obtaining a search warrant at
this juncture is made clear by the fact that the
authorities had no idea what they were looking for.
Had a warrant been obtained, it would be a sham,
would have been so
since the object of the search
26
broad as to be meaningless.
Unless the issuing magistrate is willing to grant a
search warrant without the specificity mandated

2

See Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686.

23See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 ("The inves-

tigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants
were unnecessary.").
2 "And no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched: and the person or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).

' Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686.
MId. at 691. See also State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d at
211.

by the fourth amendment, the police are forced to
proceed with other time-consuming measures such
as an autopsy to determine manner of death, from
which they can begin their investigation. All of this
may occur while the murderer is making good his
escape.
Much use has been made by the lower courts of
the idea that the police have an "inherent duty" to
investigate a murder scene thoroughly.2 7 The basis
for such a principle seems to have sprung from the
"emergency search" context. It is well established
that, in an emergency, the police have a right to
enter private property to search for injured persons.
This right is inherent in the very nature of their
duties as peace officers and derives from the common law.s8 Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme
Court has never applied this "inherent duty" rationale to a search for evidence, but the Court has
upheld searches for possibly injured persons. 2 In
light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to create a
new exception for homicide scene searches, stretching the inherent duty rationale so as to include
homicide scene searches is a possible method of
avoiding reversal, if not altogether true to the
doctrine's origins. The Supreme Court's frequent
denial of certiorari in cases where searches have
been supported by the inherent duty rationale' °
provides implicit support for the "inherent duty"
rationale as used in a homicide scene context.
Counterbalancing these arguments justifying
warrantless homicide scene searches is the principle
that the home deserves special protection from
state intrusion. As William Pitt described it:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof
may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King
of England cannot enter-all his force dares
31 not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!

27 See Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600; People v. Wallace,
31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659; State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203; State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241,276 A.2d
18.
2 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).

2 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.
3 See, e.g., Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600; Davis v.
State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76; Parsons v. State, 160
Tex. Grim. 387, 271 S.W.2d 643; State v. Oakes, 129 Vt.
241, 276 A.2d 18; Ldnguest v. State, 495 P.2d 575.
31 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. at 307 (quoting
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 379
(2d ed. 1953)).

COMMENTS

The Supreme Court also affords special protection
to the home:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent.
The historical sanctity of the home and judicial
protection of it may pose an insurmountable barrier to the creation of a new exception to the
warrant requirement that necessarily intrudes
upon the privacy of the home. However, the home's
sanctity
is already subject to a number of excep33
tions.
Many factors should be taken into consideration

when examining the need and the justification for
a new exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement. Some of these factors, such as those
affecting the time element involved, are more in
harmony with the fourth amendment theory ex-

pressed by the Supreme Court. This is because the
necessity for speed lies at the heart of those exceptions for "exigent circumstances" to which the
Court has given its blessing. Other factors, including the gravity of the offense and the lack of
specificity in a warrant application, traditionally
have been unimportant considerations by themselves, but have potentially strong appeal when
accompanied by additional factors. In any given
set of circumstances, the totality of the factors may
support allowing a warrantless search of a homicide
scene.
II. THE

EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE

Many searches of homicide scenes already fit
into one of the existing exceptions to the warrant
requirement. If "exigent circumstances"
exist,
such as a life-threatening emergency3 5 or the danger of evidence being destroyed 3 6 policemen lawfully may enter a dwelling without a warrant.
However, any search must be limited to serving the
purpose of the initial entry.3 7 For example, police
responding to a report of a seriously injured person
in a dwelling may conduct a warrantless search of
32

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 14.
- See generally Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30.
34See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 for a
definition of "exigent circumstances."
3' See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486.
"6See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757.
37See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
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the premises for the limited purpose of finding such
injured person, other possible victims, and the
perpetrator.3s A search for evidence related to the
crime ordinarily would be prohibited, but another
exception to the warrant requirement permits seizure of evidence if it is in "plain view." 39 However,
this exception only applies to evidence immediately
viewable near the scene and does not permit
searches into drawers and cabinets.
The "search incident to arrest" exception40 also
allows a limited search of a murder scene when a
suspect is captured on the premises. Chimel v. California4 1 allows the police to search the suspect and
the immediate area for weapons. The Supreme
Court has limited the scope of these exceptions
because of the "favored status" of the home.42 The
Court has repeatedly overemphasized the necessity
of a warrant at the expense of efficient law enforcement. 3 In part, it is the limitations on warrantless
searches of homes that have caused lower courts to
mold a new doctrine to correct some of the injustices of the existing rule.
Aware that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "jealously and carefully drawn" by the
Supreme Court," state and federal courts have not
acknowledged that their decisions rely on a homicide scene exception. Therefore, the doctrine has
evolved gradually as courts combined recognized
exceptions with Supreme Court dicta to justify
warrantless searches. 45 Perhaps the paradigm case
illustrating this technique used by the courts is
State v. Chapman.46 In Chapman, police were called
by the defendant to his home where the victim, the
defendant's wife, was found dead in a chair with
blood over her face, hands, and clothing. The
defendant's conflicting stories as to the cause of
death cast immediate suspicion on him, and he
was taken into custody although no formal charges
were filed. While the defendant was still in custody,
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.
'See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
4
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38

41

Id.

42Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 14 ("The right

of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance."); United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d at 977
("A person's home'holds a favored position in the list of
those areas which are protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
43See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
' Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
45See cases listed at note 4 supra.
46 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969).
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the police conducted a warrantless search of the
home. The police seized various articles of clothing
in plain view and found a whiskey bottle with
blood on it, which later proved to be the murder
weapon, in some garbage cans in the cellar. The
defendant was convicted of the murder, and he
appealed, claiming that the search and seizure of
evidence in his home without a warrant violated
his fourth amendment rights and that the evidence
should have been excluded.
In upholding the validity of the search and
subsequent seizures, the Supreme Court of Maine
emphasized two controlling facts: the initial lawful
entry of the officers by the express consent and
invitation of the defendant and the continued possession and control of the premises during the
course of the investigation.4 7 The court justified the
seizure of the fruits of the search on a number of
rationales. The court found that the clothes seized
in various rooms of the home were plainly visible
and thus were lawfully seized under the plain view
doctrine.48 However, the court held that the discovery of the bottle was the product of a further
search and thus could not fall into the category of
"plain view"; so it examined the totality of the
circumstances to determine
the reasonableness of
49
the search and seizure.
First, the court held that police have a right and
an obligation to make a thorough investigation of
premises on which a violent death has occurred.50
The court emphasized the duty of the police rather
than the fact of a homicide, citing extensively from
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Terry
v. Ohio,' which described, in dictum, certain guidelines for proper police investigatory procedures that
are free from any threatened application of the
exclusionary rule. 52 The Chapman court noted that
the entire rubric of police conduct under exami47 Id. at 205.
48
Id. at 207.
49 The issue of whether the fourth amendment's "reasonableness clause" or its "warrant clause" is dominant
has puzzled many scholars. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969). See generally
Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9
U. RICH. L. REv. 249 (1975); Williamson, The Supreme
Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances, 31
OKLA. L. REv. 110 (1978); Yackle, The Burger Court and
the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 335 (1978). The

controversy is minimized, however, by taking the more
realistic approach that "the definition of 'reasonableness'
turns, at least in part, on the more specific dictates of the
Warrant Clause." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
- 250 A.2d at 208.
"' 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52
Id. at 13-15.

nation fell within the category
of "proper police
'
investigative procedures."ss
Second, the court found that the discovery of the
body created an "emergency," or an exigent circumstance, sufficient to justify pursuing the investigation further.54 Although the typical emergency
search is constitutionally limited to a search for
other victims or suspects,s the Chapman court found
that the search could be continued until the cause
of death was uncovered because "the public had a
right to expect and demand that the police would
conduct prompt
and diligent investigations"' 6 of
57
murder scenes.
Next the court faced the question of whether the
police should have been required to obtain a warrant before proceeding with the investigation. Answering in the negative, the court stated that no
officer could have supplied the requisite factual
affidavit supporting the request for a warrant, since
all the police were looking for was some blunt
instrument that could have been the murder
weapon. 58
Finally, the court found that the house contained
evidence that could be destroyed easily, which
created another "exigent circumstance" sufficient
to justify the search for weapons.5 9 Not only was
the murder weapon located in a trash barrel that
could have been emptied, but in case the weapon
was not in the home, the police needed to determine that quickly so that other areas could be
searched before the evidence was lost or destroyed.so
Thus, the combination of exigent circumstances
and the duty of the police to promptly investigate
this murder, using proper investigative procedures,
support the Chapman decision. However, the court
avoided using language that might have implied
the creation of a new exception. Instead, the court
employed rationales and rhetoric firmly established
554 250

A.2d at 210.

d.

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.
5250 A.2d at 211.
57 The Chapman court

states:
There is no more serious offense than unlawful
homicide. The interest of society in securing a determination as to whether or not a human life has
been taken, and if so by whom and by what method,
is great indeed and may in appropriate circumstances rise above the interest in being protected
from governmental intrusion upon his privacy. In
our view this is such a case.
Id. at 210.
58
Id. at 211.
5
9 Id.
6 id.
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in the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court. However, the Chapman court extended those
rationales beyond their intended reach to justify
the search and seizure at issue. Few exigent circumstances cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court have justified a search for weapons, and
61
these were strictly limited. Likewise, the "inherent
duty" of police officers rationale and the "proper
investigative procedures" rationale used by the
Chapman court were taken from the Supreme Court
opinion in Tery v. Ohio, but that case dealt with
stop and frisk law, not searches of homicide scenes.
The Supreme Court has never intimated any possible application of Terry to murder scene cases.
Nevertheless, the technique of the Chapman court
62
has become the norm for other courts attempting
to justify warrantless searches and seizures of homicide scenes using existing fourth amendment doctrines.
III. MINcEY v. ARIZONA
63
In State v. Mincey, the Arizona Supreme Court
recognized the inapplicability of both the classic
exceptions to the warrant requirement and the
"inherent duty" rationale created by the Chapman
court and others to the search of a homicide scene.
Recognizing the United States Supreme Court's
position that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable with only "a few specifically established
64
and well-delineated exceptions," the court held
that a warrantless search of a homicide scene, when
set
conducted in accordance with the guidelines
6
5
forth in its opinion, was such an exception.
The search in question in Mincey followed a
narcotics raid of an apartment and a shootout
between police and occupants, in which a police
officer was killed. Two different searches were con61 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (search incident to arrest-search limited to suspect's person and
immediate vicinity within his control); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299 ("hot pursuit" search of dwelling
limited to finding occupants and any weapons which
could be used by the suspect to escape).
62See cases listed in note 4 supra.
63 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
6'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357.
115 Ariz. at 482, 566 P.2d at 283. First, it must be
the scene of a homicide or of a serious personal injury
with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect
foul play. Second, the search must be limited to determining the circumstances of death and the scope must
not exceed that purpose. Third, the search must begin
within a reasonable period following the time when the
officials first learn of the murder or potential murder. Id.
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ducted, but only the second was at issue. In the
first search, the officers at the scene conducted an
immediate inspection of the premises for other
6
persons, which is a legitimate emergency search. 6
Shortly thereafter, homicide detectives arrived at
the apartment, sealed it off, and proceeded to
conduct a second, four-day warrantless search of
the premises, during the course of which over two
67
hundred objects were seized. In approving this
search, the state court used a reasonableness standard to establish limits on police conduct.
For the search to be reasonable, the purpose must
be limited to determining the circumstances of
death and the scope must not exceed that purpose.
The search must also begin within a reasonable
period following the time when the officials first
learn of the murder (or potential murder). ... Although [the] [o]fficer [was] not dead [yet], it was
reasonable to believe that death was likely and that
a murder charge a possibility. The search was aimed
6
at establishing the circumstances of death. 8
Although the language of the court is circumspect
and limits the scope of the search to determining
the circumstances of death, one must keep in mind
that the court approved an "intensive, four-day
warrantless search which included ripping up car69
pets and opening dresser drawers." Nevertheless,
the state high court sustained the search and the
convictions of the defendants.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the state defended its search in several ways, three
of which are pertinent to the Arizona court's creation of a homicide scene exception to the fourth
70
amendment's warrant clause. The first of these
attempted justifications involved an argument for
inclusion of the murder scene search under the
already existing emergency exception. Responding
to this argument, the Court set out the boundaries
6

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.

67

Id. at 389.

6

115 Ariz. at 482-83, 566 P.2d at 283-84.

69437 U.S. at 389.
70The State also argued that no constitutionally pro-

tected right of privacy was invaded by the search of
Mincey's apartment. 437 U.S. at 391. The first prong of
this argument was that Mincey, by shooting a police
officer, forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court rejected this notion, citing its decision in
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). The second
prong of the privacy argument advanced by the state was
that the initial intrusion to arrest was so great that the
subsequent search added little harm. Rejecting this argument, the Court cited its opinion in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.
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of the emergency exception:
Numerous state and federal cases have recognized
that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police
officers from making warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when
the police come upon the scene of a homicide they
may make a prompt warrantless search of the area
to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still
on the premises?'1
While these criteria justified the initial search of
Mincey's apartment for suspects and victims of the
shooting, the Court condemned the extensive fourday search because life and limb were not in jeopardy.72 Although the Court refused to accept the
Arizona court's broadening of the emergency exception, it did not question the right of police to
respond to emergency situations.7" Because the
Court left the emergency exception intact, there
remains room for the future development of a
homicide scene exception.
The second argument raised by Arizona in defense of the new exception invoked the public
interest in prompt investigation of crimes of this
gravity. The state argued that because of the seriousness of the crime of murder, the public interest
demanded prompt investigation and apprehension
of the murderer. The usual warrant requirement
delays investigation and may allow a murderer to
escape. Therefore, the public interest in prompt
investigation of homicides, supports a homicide
scene exception.74 A similar argument was made
to, and accepted by, the Maine Supreme Court in
State v. Chapman.75 However, the Supreme Court in
Mincey rejected this contention because there is a
public interest in prompt investigation of all serious
crimes, and "the mere fact that law enforcement
may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of the fourth amendment." 76 This
rejection by the Court of the public interest and
gravity of the crime argument has caused the
greatest difficulty for the post-Mincey viability of a
71Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.
7 Id. at 393. "All the persons in Mincey's apartment
had been located before the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began their search. And a four-day
search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping
up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the
legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search." Id.
(citations omitted).
73
Id.at 392.
74
Id.at 393.
75250 A.2d at 210. See note 57 supra.
76 437 U.S. at 393.

homicide scene exception, but as will be seen, does
not dispense with the issue altogether.
Arizona's third argument is perhaps the most
interesting from the viewpoint of warrantless
searches in general. The state contended that the
guidelines drawn up by the Arizona Supreme
Court for warrantless searches of homicide scenes
were sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster. 77 Since the Supreme Court has often reiterated
how narrow the recognized exceptions are, 78 this
argument for court-created narrow guidelines
might have appealed to the Justices as consistent
with the Court's general philosophy. Indeed, the
extensive effort of the Court to refute the state's
contention in this area at the very least shows the
Court's interest in the argument. The Court attacked this proposition from two directions that,
when analyzed conjunctively, reveal the weak link
in the Court's attack on the homicide scene exception.
First, the Court looked at the effect of the courtauthorized search. The Court held that the Arizona
Supreme Court guidelines were not sufficiently
narrow since they permitted a four-day, extremely
intrusive search. 7' The Court did not discuss the
permissibility of a more limited search and narrower guidelines. However, the Court's discussion
of "effects" is significant because it shows a willingness to scrutinize a warrantless search under reasonableness standards as well as under
the stricter
8
requirements of the warrant clause. 0
In its second attack on the "narrow guidelines"
argument, the Court brought out its traditional
arsenal, asserting that the Arizona Supreme
Court's guidelines for the homicide scene exception
did not afford sufficient protection to a person in
whose home a homicide or assault occurs.
They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such terms as "reasonable
... search," "serious personal injury with likelihood
of death where there is reason to suspect foul play,"
and "reasonable period." It is precisely this kind of
judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and
scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amend77

Id. at 394. See note 65 supra for the list of guidelines
drawn
up by the Arizona court.
78
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at
381 (Powell, J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. at 481; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. at 34; Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357; Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
71Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393.
'3 See note 49 supra.
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ment requires be made by a neutral and objective
8
magistrate, not a police officer.
Taken in isolation, this statement would indicate
that the State's argument for the homicide scene
exception failed to penetrate the rubric of the
Court's traditional fourth amendment emphasis
on the warrant requirement. However, with the
Court's examination of the effects of the search,
which is necessarily a reasonableness scrutiny, one
could conclude that the Arizona court merely went
too far in giving police officers unbridled discre2
tion. The Supreme Court did not specifically
condemn what could be called "bridled discretion," or in other words, narrower guidelines that
would result in a more reasonable search.
IV. AFTERMATH OF MINCEY

Sensing that the Supreme Court had not closed
the book on homicide scene searches with Mincey,
8
the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Epperson 3
added yet another chapter in the continuing effort
of lower courts to alleviate the harshness of the
warrant requirement. In Epperson, there were actually three police searches that came under judicial scrutiny. The first was an emergency search
generated by the victim's unexplained public absence and the odor of decomposing flesh emanating
from her residence. According to the Eppersoncourt,
these facts indicated foul play and justified the
officers' entry without a warrant to search for her
4
body.8 Once the body was found, a second search
of the house was also justified as a continuation of
the emergency search for other victims, since the
decedent's two children were also missing.85 Any
evidence seized during the initial entry and the
was admissible under
continued search for victims
86
the plain view doctrine.
However, in Epperson the police conducted a
8'437 U.S. at 394-95.
8' The Supreme Court intimated that if the fact situation had not involved such an aggravated search, and
the Arizona court had not attempted to create a new
exception, it would have done its utmost to justify the
search. "It may well be that the circumstances described
by the Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally sufficient to warrant a search of substantial
scope." 437 U.S. at 395. Mincey was remanded for a
determination of which evidence found in the apartment
was permissibly seized under established fourth amendment standards. Id. at 395 n.9.
8 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978) (en bane).
84Id. at 264.
Id. at 266.
86Id.
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third search of the premises and seized additional
evidence which led to the conviction of the defendant for the murder of his wife and children. He
challenged this third search on appeal, and the
Missouri court held that this third search did not
fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement:
This evidence was discovered as the result of Sergeant Duffner's search of the rest of the house
immediately following the initial search for defendant (a source of potential danger) or other victims
by Officer Schindler and Epperson's father. If the
evidence had been found moments earlier during
Schindler's cursory search, it would clearly8 7have
been admissible under the plain view theory.
Since the court could not justify this third search
under any recognized warrant exception, it had to
face squarely Mincey's apparent prohibition against
warrantless searches of murder scenes. Nevertheless, the court upheld the validity of the third
search by distinguishing Mincey88 and relying on
the Supreme Court's previous decision in Michigan
89
v. Tyler. In Tyler, fire officials conducted a warrantless search of a burned-out building for evidence of arson immediately after the fire was extinguished. This investigation continued for some
hours, was interrupted by smoke and poor light,
°
and then resumed a few hours later.9 The Court
upheld the warrantless search as reasonable even
though the fire officials possibly could have pro9
cured a warrant. ' Although the Tyler case involved
9 2
an administrative search which may be subject
93
to different standards of probable cause, the Epperson court found it relevant to a determination of
8

7 id.
8sThe Epperson court distinguished the limited nature
of the search in question from the four-day search in
Mincey. Id. at 268 n.2.
89 Id. at 268 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499).
90Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 501-02.
"justice Stewart, writing for the court, noted:
On the facts of this case, we do not believe that
a warrant was necessary for the morning re-entries
[of the building and seizure of evidence] on January
22 .... We find that the morning entries were no
more than an actual continuation of the first [entry,
which was hampered by poor visibility], and the
lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence.
Id. at 511.
'2 See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523.
"' "The showing of probable cause necessary to secure
a warrant may vary with the object and intrusiveness of
the search, but the necessity for the warrant persists." 436
U.S. at 506.
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the scope of a warrantless police search. Noting
that the exigent quality94 of the situation in Epperson was heightened by discovery of the brutally
murdered bodies, the court stated:
The limited superficial search that followed and the
removal of the bodies, the taking of the photographs
of a few scenes in the house and the removal of the
few items of personal property not located in the
bedroom were within the reasonable time, spatial
scope and limited intensity approved by Tyler. 5
The Epperson court limited this type of murder
scene search to finding only "readily accessible
evidence of the crime."9 But even this restriction
cannot blur the result of its holding: a serious
erosion of Mincey's prohibition of warrantless
searches for evidence at a homicide scene. The
Missouri Supreme Court in Eppersonacknowledged
the constitutional problem created by the search it
was asked to validate, but it extended the scope of
the search exception to include other victims or
suspects
by sidestepping Mincey and relying on
7
Tyler.'

It remains to be seen whether the limited homicide scene search for evidence permitted in Epperson
will be adopted by other state courts in the same
manner that the "inherent duty of police" rationale
was adopted after State v. Chapman."9 The more
important issue is how the Supreme Court will
react to a lower court decision resting on the Epperson case. The greater limitations of the Epperson
search will probably satisfy the Supreme Court
where the limitations in Mincey did not. In fact, if
the hesitation discernible in the Mincey opinion
toward invalidating properly limited guidelines is
genuine, then the lower courts may not have to
rely on Tyler as the Epperson court did. Instead, the
lower courts may develop a homicide scene exception acceptable to the Supreme Court.
4The attempt to bring a search under an existing
exception by use of recognizable fourth amendment language taken out of context is plainly discernible. See
generally cases cited in note 4 supra. No Supreme Court
decision has ever supported the notion that discovery of
the body "heightens" the exigent quality of the emergency and justifies a more expansive search than one to
find other victims or suspects.
"5State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d at 268.
9Id. at 266 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S,. 499).
97 The Epperson court never considered that perhaps
Michigan v. Tyler was inapposite, since administrative
searches are a species unto themselves. However, even the
Mincey court cited Tyler in its opinion on the subject of
reasonable, limited scope searches. 437 U.S. at 392.
"8250 A.2d 203. See cases cited in note 4 supra.

V. THE

RELATIONSHIP OF THE HOMICIDE SCENE
SEARCH TO EXISTING EXCEPTIONS

Regardless of the impact of Epperson, the homicide scene exception is assured of continuing vital-

ity despite Mincey because of its interrelationship
with the exigent circumstances exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Since the homicide scene
creates an exigent circumstance, it is necessary to
examine the rationales supporting the exigent circumstances exception. The first discussion of the
subject by the Supreme Court came in 1948, in
McDonaldv. UnitedStates." The Court, emphasizing
the importance of the warrant requirement, stated:
"We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption
from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies
'
of the situation make that course imperative." 00
Basically, this means that the necessity for the
search must outweigh the privacy interests of the
individual, or alternatively, that the governmental
purpose for the search will be frustrated by the
requirement to procure a warrant. 10 '
Theoretically, such a rule sounds fair enough,
but as one court noted, "a myriad of circumstances
could fall within the terms 'exigent circumstances'.
•...,12 The difficulty with such a rule arises in its
application to the facts of any particular case.
Therein lies the opportunity for lower courts to
justify warrantless searches of murder scenes under
an existing doctrine recognized by the Supreme
Court. While some lower courts emphasize the
reasonableness of the search given the exigencies of
the situation, other courts have refused to examine
the reasonableness question when the practicability
of obtaining a warrant is evident.'0 3
The emergency exception, a subcategory of the
exigency rule, allows police to enter and search the
premises without a warrant when police have reason to believe that an unnatural death has occurred
or may occur.1' 4 The emergency exception supports
the case for a homicide scene exception. In the
typical emergency situation, the police will enter a
home in response to a report of a dead body or
injured person. The entry, as well as any search for
the reported victim, is justified by the emergency
99335 U.S. 451 (1948).
oo Id. at 456 (emphasis added).

101Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
'02 Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.
Cir.3 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
10 See State v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 557 P.2d
399
(1976) (en banc). See also note 42 supra.
14 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.
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exception.
The exception also will support an
additional search for other victims or perpetrators.
Even though such a search must be limited only to
a search for persons and does not justify looking in
areas where a person could not be, any other
evidence out in the open can be seized under the
plain view doctrine.1'6 Consequently, if the police
receive a report of a body at a certain residence,
they are able, without a warrant, to enter the
premises, conduct a search for the body, conduct
a further search for other victims or suspects, and
seize any evidence in plain view during any of
these searches. In such cases, the police are apt to
find the murder weapon during the search if it is
still on the premises. Therefore, in many cases
involving a murder in a dwelling, there is no need
to rely on any homicide scene exception, because
the critical evidence will be found pursuant to
existing exceptions. Since the homicide scene is
being searched to a large degree already, there is
very little further sacrifice of fourth amendment
protection in creating a full, homicide scene exception to the warrant requirement.
In some cases, the need to search a homicide
scene thoroughly may be justified by invoking the
exigent circumstances exception for evidence that
is being destroyed, might be destroyed, or might
be moved out of the jurisdiction. 10 7 In many cases
this exception involves a search for the suspect
because he is the only person likely to destroy or
remove evidence, but this is not always the case.
As the Supreme Court noted in the administrative
search case of Michigan v. Tyler:'0 8 "Immediate investigation may also be necessary to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction."' 9 The concern for possible destruction of
evidence noted in Tyler applies only to administrative searches of fire scenes for the causes thereof. In
criminal cases, however, the Court is much stricter.
For example, in United States v.Johnson," ° the Court
forbade officers to enter a room where opium was
detected, even though the evidence was literally
going up in smoke.," If and when the Court is
10os/d.

" See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443.
'07
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (arson

investigation); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(blood sample). Cf Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (odor of burning opium).
1 436 U.S. 499.
109Id. at 510. Tyler was an administrative search case,
and the fire scene was a unique situation calling for the
"easily destroyed evidence" exception.
"o 333 U.S. 10. See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30.
. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
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ready to follow the lead of lower courts"' and
sanction a search upon possible destruction of evidence in a criminal case, the door may be opened
to more extensive homicide scene searches.
The exigency exception for easily destroyed evidence was given an enlarged scope in People v.
Superior Court."' There, police conducted a warrantless search of the premises where a murder
reportedly occurred. Because the owner of the
premises was not in custody, the police feared that
the evidence would be destroyed before a warrant
could be obtained. The court supported this warrantless action: "In these circumstances we consider
it both the right and the duty of the police, in the
interest of society and of potential suspects, to
conduct a prompt and diligent investigation at the
scene of the homicide for clues to its cause and its
perpetrator."'" 4 Although the SuperiorCourt decision5
conflicts with previous Supreme Court decisions,"
it still evidences an attempt to extend the permissible scope of a homocide scene search.
Whether the warrant clause or the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment is the ultimate
standard in determining the applicability of one of
the warrant exceptions, 6 it is clear that some
subjective consideration of the circumstances must
be taken into account in each case." 7 Any time the
facts and circumstances are taken into account,
there is much room for extending any given exception beyond its present limits. Indeed, this has been
the result in a number of cases. In People v.Sirhan,"'s
the court extended the emergency exception to
include public emergencies. There the police conducted a warrantless search of the apartment of
Robert Kennedy's assassin soon after the murder.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the search on the theory of a "public emergency" in the wake of the assassination because it
was in the public interest to quell any rumors of a9
conspiracy to kill a number of political leaders.i
Similarly, in United States v.Melville120 police capSee, e.g., cases listed in note 4 supra.
341 Cal. App. 3d 636, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1974).
11 Id. at 641, 116 Cal. Rptr. at
27.
"s See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (narcotics raid);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (narcotics raid).
"sSee note 49 supra.
17 The recurring questions of the reasonableness of
searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
"87 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1972) (en banc).
"9 Id. at 739, 497 P.2d at 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
'20
309 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
112
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tured a suspect in connection with a rash of bombings in New York City. The court upheld a warrantless search of the defendant's dwelling on the
theory that an emergency existed since more bombs
might be planted somewhere and immediate detection was imperative. 121 Neither the Sirhan nor
the Melville searches were for wounded victims or
suspects on the premises, as is usually required in
an emergency search.12 Nevertheless, those courts
used the nomenclature of "emergency" to justify
the searches. Although these were not searches of
homicide scenes, the doctrines supporting the
searches could be employed to extend the present
boundaries of a homicide scene search.
The emergency exception doctrine was extended
differently in Brown v. Jones."2 In Brown, police
responded to an emergency call, entered a house,
and found a body. They searched further and
found bloody clothes in a hamper. The clothes led
to the conviction of the victim's son. In upholding
the search, the court emphasized the necessity for
quick action: "Time was of the essence in this case
since the unknown assailant might be fleeing further away with every passing moment, and possible
evidence leading to identification might be laying
at hand. ' ' 2UThis type of evidentiary search could
easily pass Supreme Court scrutiny as a narrow
homicide scene exception, since the only known
occupant was dead, and the fourth amendment
"protects people not places. ' 2 This type of evidentiary search constitutes another possible extension of the present scope of homicide scene searches.
The expansion of existing exceptions relate to
the homicide scene exception in two ways. First,
they indicate that should the Supreme Court be
unwilling to recognize even a limited homicide
scene exception, then the lower courts will employ
the existing exceptions to ameliorate the harsh
results of existing doctrine. Second, as the lower
courts continue their expansion of the homicide
scene doctrine by alternate means, the Supreme
Court may be convinced to examine the wisdom of
its views concerning the homicide scene exception.
According to one commentator, the results in warrant exception cases have been much more reasonable than the Supreme Court's language would
suggest, indicating that the "well-delineated excep121Id.at

831.
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392.
12 407 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 489 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1974).
'2 Id.at 691.
'25
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
2

tions" principle is a myth. 26 Perhaps it would
require only a small impetus for the Court to
expressly create such a homicide scene exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law concerning warrantless searches has
always fluctuated. Before Mincey, this was especially
true of warrantless searches of dwellings where a
murder had been committed. Despite contrary Supreme Court opinions in this area, for at least ten
years prior to Mincey, some state and lower federal
courts expanded existing exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Lower courts upheld homicide scene
searches based upon rationales of the "inherent
duty" of police to search a murder scene, the use of
"legitimate investigative procedures," and general
notions of reasonableness. The sheer number of
these cases suggested the presence of a vacuum in
this area of fourth amendment theory. In filling
that vacuum, the lower courts failed to establish a
"well-delineated" exception as required by the Supreme Court. However, the Court encouraged this
process by foregoing opportunities to review those
lower court decisions. As a result of the Court's
inaction, a line of lower court cases rested upon the
same reasoning and analysis.
The Mincey Court appeared to resolve the issue
when it refused to recognize the creation of a
homicide scene exception by the Arizona courts.
There were indications in the Mincey opinion, however, that suggested that the egregious nature of
the search involved was the main determinative
factor in the Court's reversal, rather than the attempted establishment of the exception by the
Arizona court. Such was the conclusion of the
Missouri Supreme Court in Epperson, which distinguished Mincey solely on the basis of the outrageous
search involved there.
While the Supreme Court may not sanction any
search justified as a homicide scene exception, the
doctrine will not atrophy, because of its close relationship with the exigent circumstances exceptions.
The homicide scene exception grew out of the
inadequacies of the existing exceptions. If not allowed a place as a recognized exception in its own
right, it will continue to surface as an extended
emergency search or as a search to preserve easily
destroyed evidence. The Mincey decision may have
slowed the growth of the homicide scene exception
but by no means has it resolved the issue.
BRUCE D. HAUSKNECHT
126

Haddad, supra note 2, at 199.

